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A Snapshot of Community Currency Systems in Europe and North America

Contents

Introduction 2

1. Achieving Critical Mass 3

1.1 Getting Started     3

The "Wedge" 3
Community Way 4
The Bonus Concept 5

1.2 Integrating Business 6

The LETS Environment 7
The HOURS Environment 8
Barter Systems 9
Barter and Community Currency Systems 9

1.3 Multiple Community Trading 10

MultiLETS 11
Talents 13
Exchange Rates Between Community Currencies 13

2. Operating Issues 14

2.1 Fiscal Tools 14

Fees 14
Budget Spending 15

2.2 Monetary Tools 15

Loans 15
Money Supply 16
Demurrage 18

2.3 Inflation 19

Tying the Community Currency 19
Internal Inflation 20

3. LETS, HOURS or Both? 21

3.1 LETS and HOURS 21

3.2 Hybrid Systems 23

3.3 Community Fit 25

4. Key Success Factors 26

4.1 The People 26

4.1.1 The 'Champion' 26
4.1.2 Administration 27
4.1.3 General Participants 28

4.2 The Community 28

4.3 Responding to Real Needs 30

4.3.1 Agriculture 30
4.3.2 Input Factors: Wages, Credit and Rent 31
4.3.3 Social Services 32
4.3.4 Taxes 33

Conclusion 33

Acknowledgements 35

Bibliography 37


[The Economic Means to Freedom - Part V - Related text]


Jeff Powell and Menno Salverda
c/o CUSO Thailand
17 Phaholyothin Golf Village, Phaholyothin Road
Chatuchak, Bangkok 10900

Tel/Fax: +66-2-513-3031

Email: <cusothai@loxinfo.co.th> or <salverda@wxs.nl>

Version 2.0 (06-20-98)


Introduction

This paper was written to serve two purposes. The first is to provide partner agencies in the Thai Community Currency Systems (TCCS) project with a summary of the current state of community currency system development (c. 1998) and an introduction to the issues being grappled with. Secondly, it is hoped that this paper can stimulate new ideas and debate by linking the work of existing practitioners. It is expected that there may be some tension between these objectives; partner agencies may find the discussion of system design issues overwhelming at times, while those with extensive experience may feel that some of the discussion and analysis is self-evident. We hope this does not discourage the reader. Those who are unfamiliar with community currency systems might refer to the articles or books mentioned in the bibliography which discuss these systems in more detail.

The report summarises the preliminary research for the TCCS project which has been funded by the Japan Foundation, CUSO and VSO (Voluntary Service Overseas). The intent of the research was to provide the authors with as much practical experience in community currency systems application as was possible within monetary and time constraints. For a list of those whom the authors contacted please refer to the acknowledgements. The goal of the TCCS project is to share this experience with partner agencies in Thailand in order that, together, an appropriate system may be created for use in the Thai context and its effectiveness analysed. A more detailed explanation of the TCCS project, its rationale, objectives and implementation plan, is available upon request.

Approximately one thousand community currency systems are operating in North America and Europe. Roughly speaking, the systems fall into four categories. The first, and largest, group, based on the principle of mutual credit, includes LETS (Local Employment and Trading Systems) and LETS-like trading communities. These systems are located predominantly in Canada and the United Kingdom, with derivatives, such as the Noppes system in the Netherlands, appearing across Europe. The second group, fiat systems which print their own notes, has grown out of the Ithaca HOURS initiative in New York State (although there is an impressive historical precedent for such schemes). The majority of such systems are in the United States, although a few have spread to Canada and Europe. The third group, which can be called 'hybrid' systems, are those which combine various elements of LETS and HOURS systems, and can not, therefore, be considered as one or the other. The final category is based on a 'community service bank' concept. The best known of such systems, called TimeDollars, has enjoyed a good deal of support from peoples' organisations and government bodies alike in the United States. [Since the goal of the TCCS project is to focus on the broader role of community currencies in economic development rather than their impact purely on the provision of social services (though, certainly, to a great degree, these two are intertwined), we have chosen to concentrate our studies on the first three groups and only briefly discuss the TimeDollars concept.]

The paper is divided into four sections. The first three sections discuss system design issues, beginning with an explanation of initiatives intended to help systems reach critical mass, continuing with an analysis of operating issues such as taxation and inflation, and concluding with a comparison of LETS, HOURS and hybrid systems. In the final section, those elements which were most often mentioned by participants as being crucial to success are summarised and discussed. This includes 'people' issues such as the project 'champion', the administrative committee, and both the internal and external community, as well as a brief analysis of those needs which must eventually be addressed if community currency systems are to play a significant role in economic life.

We hope that anyone who has any comments or questions about either the information or the analysis contained herein will contact us at the address noted above. The next phase of the TCCS project is to incorporate this feedback, that of our partner agencies in Thailand, and further study of indigenous exchange systems in the region, into the adaptation of community currency systems for use in Thailand.

By no means should this paper be considered an exhaustive study of the subject matter. For discussion purposes only.


1. Achieving Critical Mass

Community currency systems have had difficulty reaching a level of trading which is significant in the eyes of a broad cross-section of community members. Herein, we discuss three initiatives which attempt to gain community currency systems greater acceptance and use.

 

1.1 Getting Started

The "Wedge"

During start-up it can be difficult to overcome the simple reluctance of community members to trade in a currency that they are not familiar with. Unlike cash, cheques and credit cards, whose acceptance has reached the level of the sub-conscious, the use of community currency requires a directed effort. Several of the individuals spoken with expressed the need for a big event which uses community currency to pay for inputs in order to kick-start acceptance of the new trading format. To describe this phenomena, Sat Khalsa, one of the people behind Toronto LETS, coined the term "wedge".

The wedge could be a home renovation, a community project or a small business start-up. More ambitious would be the establishment of a 'business incubator', where office/retail/factory space, equipment and services could be paid for in community currency. The wedge should get community currency into the hands of a wide range of people, allowing them to begin trading without having to first earn credits (or, alternately, assume a negative account balance in a LETS). What is important is that the stakeholders be trusted members of the community who have a means to pay back the credit they are extended. Without the presence of interest rates, the downside risks are small compared to conventional business start-ups.

There is the often cited example of Deli Dollars in Great Barrington, Massachusetts. When restaurant owner Frank Tortoriello's lease expired, he was refused a loan by the local bank which would have allowed him to move to a new location. Tortoriello decided to print his own notes, Deli Dollars, which could initially be purchased for $9US and would be redeemable for $10US worth of food in six months time. During those six months, Tortoriello moved his store with the nearly $5,000US he raised, and, more interestingly, the notes took on a value of their own. Trading in Deli Dollars was happening all over town. By assuming a large future commitment to return goods (sandwiches, in this instance) to the community, Tortoriello created the wedge which spurred trading activity.

Creating a wedge requires planning, creativity and small business skills, not to mention careful timing. This reinforces the need to involve the business sector, where such skills abound, early on in system development.

Community Way

The Community Way model, designed by Michael Linton, creates an initial 'opening' through which trading can be encouraged and acceptance of the community currency increased. Community Way involves three steps:

1. A community currency systems development group solicits local business for donations to social organisations (such as an HIV/AIDS hospice). These 'donations' are not to be made in cash or goods/services, as is normally done, but in a future commitment to accept community currency units at par with the national currency following pre-agreed upon conditions. These conditions may include, for example, that community currency units can only be used on slow business days; or, can only be used for up to the profit margin percentage of the sales price, say 30%.

2. The community currency systems development group prints an amount of community currency vouchers equivalent to the total 'donations' (remember, future commitments) of local business. These are sold by social organisations to community members at par with the national currency. They are bought with the knowledge that they are backed by local business, and that they are providing much-needed assistance to social organisations. The HIV/AIDS hospice can now use this national currency as it sees fit.

3. Community members redeem their vouchers at participating businesses, who are obligated to redeem at least the amount that they agreed to donate. In all likelihood, some businesses will attract more/less vouchers than they had agreed to donate; it is very unlikely that community members will spend them in the same proportion in which they were donated. In the former instance, as long as community currency acceptance ratios are equal to or less than profit margins, there is no loss in net profit and still the possibility of generating new customers. If, on the other hand, no vouchers are redeemed, the (unpopular) business has lost nothing and, perhaps, has gained positive publicity for their participation in the project.

At the time of writing, Community Way programmes had been attempted - all without success - in Victoria, Manchester, Hawaii and Vancouver. A renewed attempt is under way in the San Francisco Bay area. The authors can only surmise that the failure of Community Way has been in the implementation. While, the concept of merchant credits appears sound, the success of Community Way is largely dependent on the perception of the organisers. Small business owners will only want to expend their limited resources in supporting efforts which are well recognised in the community. Community Way organisers should not underestimate the role of influential individuals and the need to seek out their support.

The Bonus Concept

The 'Bonus' concept was developed by Bruno Jehle, a member of INWO (Internationale Vereinigung fur Wirtschaftsordnung, or International Association of Natural Economic Order) in Switzerland. Learning from experiences with development work in India, the Bonus concept is designed to deal with two problems which might arise if a community currency system was implemented there. The first problem comes from the political situation in India where middlemen and village leaders, in addition to bankers and government officials, hold dominant positions in the conventional money market. Their fear of losing control of the credit market and, therefore, political influence when a community currency system is introduced, may lead them to use their political power to block the community initiative. Secondly, if a community currency system were to collapse, either because of the aforementioned political resistance or because confidence in the system is lost, participants with positive account balances would be adversely affected. The value of the resources sold up to that point would be lost presuming that at least some of them could have been sold in the market for national currency.

The Bonus system begins with donor funds being given to a community-based credit committee. This committee, in turn, loans the money out to interested community members. The credit committee decides on what form the lending will take--lending circles, credit union style lending, or individual loans. The credit is initially issued exclusively in conventional cash, is interest-free, and can be paid back partially or completely in local currency units (called 'Bonuses'). This creates demand for Bonuses in the local economy.

Bonuses, in the form of paper notes, are now issued by a separate committee to members of the community. The amount issued should not exceed the total value of national currency loans which may be repaid in Bonuses. Distribution could be organised via a subsidy to low wage earners. Notably, this requires that the Bonus committee is able to effectively manage the demand and supply of the local currency units.

Not all of the donor money will be issued as loans to the community. Half of the funds would be set aside in a depot (this could be a conventional bank) to 'backup' the local currency if confidence in the Bonus is lost. This could happen if, for example, middlemen try to convince community members that the Bonuses are worthless and offer to buy them at a discounted price. The backup of the local currency acts as a safety valve because participants know they can redeem their Bonuses for conventional money. The Bonuses could similarly be backed up by rice or some other highly valued good. Historically, when there have been runs on banks, once depositors realise that there are adequate gold reserves to redeem their notes, they do not want the gold. The same logic underlies the Bonus concept. To prevent Bonuses from being swapped for hard currency immediately after issuance, a penalty fee could be charged on those Bonuses which are redeemed before a certain amount of time elapses. This would encourage the use of the Bonuses for local trading.

After the loans have been paid back, it is possible that the whole system would come to a standstill. The process would begin again, with the difference that loans would be issued partially in Bonuses. It is hoped that eventually, as the community becomes more familiar with the community currency, the loans could be issued completely in Bonuses and national currency backing would be unnecessary.

The BONUS concept claims several advantages over unbacked community currency:

The disadvantages of the Bonus concept include the following:

While on paper the Bonus concept provides a means to deal with the problems of middlemen and system failure, there remain numerous question marks. Until such time as a viable model has been established, it remains to be seen if the claimed advantages over unbacked systems hold true.

 1.2 Integrating Business

One of the most frequently mentioned shortcomings of community currency systems is the lack of involvement of local business. Whereas "individual traders know what they want but don't know what to offer, businesses know what they have, but don't know what they want (from participation in a community currency system)."

The LETS Environment

There is a widely held view that LETS are clubs, with links to the 'green', anarchist, or 'alternative' movements, which exclusively involve social favour trading intended for the unemployed and the poor. While it is true that people with less cash see immediate benefit to participation in community currency systems, it does not follow from this that businesses can not enjoy numerous benefits from participation. Small businesses stand to increase market share, reduce excess inventory, and replace input costs in scarce national currency with those in community currency. The resulting increase in the diversity of goods and services available for trade benefits all members of the system irrespective of social standing.

Peterborough LETS, in Peterborough, Ontario, Canada, which boasts the fastest membership growth of North American LETS, has over 500 members, one third of whom are businesses. This is in stark contrast to the decidedly low levels of business involvement in virtually all other systems observed. While a few systems do, in fact, remain committed to individual 'social-favour' trading, most are taking steps similar to those taken in Peterborough in order to attract business. Three main elements separate the approach of Peterborough LETS:

 

1) A willingness to include the business sector is made clear from the outset and strategic alliances are chosen accordingly. Peterborough LETS is housed in the offices of COIN (Community Opportunity and Innovation Network), allowing them to receive support from Human Resources Canada. The local Chamber of Commerce was involved during the early stages of system implementation.

2) A paid staff position is dedicated to promoting business entry, facilitating participation and providing ongoing education. The 'business outreach' position is a fully salaried staff member in Peterborough supported by a federal government grant. Guelph LETS, in Guelph, Ontario, Canada, has also received a grant to support such a position. This is in response to the fact that, on average, six visits are required before a small business in Guelph agrees to join the LETS.

3) Business involvement is heavily promoted. Peterborough LETS has printed "We Accept Green Dollars" stickers which participating businesses can display in their storefront window. Articles about the benefits of a community currency system which feature the involvement of local business are included in the members' bulletin and circulated to local/regional newspapers and magazines. Guelph LETS plans to promote business participation through the creation of a brochure for distribution to tourists. This will include both a downtown map highlighting Guelph LETS supporters and a 'free' Green Dollar. Rather than simply printing more notes (and, thereby, raising the spectre of inflation), these Green Dollars will be debited to businesses who attend a fund-raising event.

Manchester LETS, in Manchester, UK, having realised that the lack of local business participation was a barrier to reaching sustainability, is now directing a great deal of effort towards this end. Credit unions have been invited to handle business accounts through the LETSystem. Seminars and training sessions have been organised to publicise the benefits for business. When joining Manchester LETS, businesses are advised to start slowly incorporating local currency ratios in their prices. This initial caution prevents businesses from accumulating large credits which they may be unable to spend. Together with LETS administrators, businesses are encouraged to examine where their operating costs originate and determine which expenses could be replaced by ones paid for in community currency. At present there are 50 businesses out of a total of 600 account holders.

The HOURS Environment

HOURS systems have a marked advantage over LETS when it comes to involving business - namely, the use of paper notes instead of debit-zero accounting. (This is untrue, however, of hybrid systems. See 3.2 Hybrid systems.) The greatest threat to business integration in an HOURS environment is the participation of over-zealous businesses - those which take in more hours than they can spend.

There are two measures taken by HOURS administrators to prevent the creation of 'wells'. The first, identical to Manchester LETS, is to restrict businesses from accepting HOURS for the full sales price of goods on offer until they have proven their ability to spend them. Organisations which accept more HOURS than they are able to spend damage not only themselves but also the community in general, since excess HOURS are, effectively, taken out of circulation. Such concerns led the Ithaca community to discourage the local branch of an international grocery chain from accepting HOURS. It was feared that, once the supermarket had more HOURS than it could reasonably spend, it could afford to give away the notes as a promotional gimmick. This would lead to a 'devaluation' of the HOURS in the eyes of community members.

The second method used to prevent the creation of 'wells' is to provide personal shopping lists for those organisations which earn lots of HOURS. Volunteer help is enlisted to ascertain what an individual or business needs and then try to match those needs with available offers. If those needs can not be met by pre-existing offers, new linkages may be created. In the case of Ben & Jerry's, a socially-conscious ice cream store, when it was discovered that the owners had been hoping to renovate the shop, administrators arranged for an HOURS loan which could be used to pay local craftspeople to do the renovation work. Ben & Jerry's is now repaying the loan with HOURS earned from ice cream sales. (The authors were very pleased to assist in this effort.) Up to a maximum of one-eighth of an HOUR (1.25$US) can be used on any single purchase, allowing the shop to meet both its federal and local currency requirements.

 Barter Systems

Barter systems are gaining increasing popularity world-wide. Estimates place the total value of barter in all its forms, including counter-trade, at nearly one third of total global economic flows. The attraction of barter for business lies in its ability to increase turnover; not just in the barter currency but also in the national currency as participants are able to reach more customers. Furthermore, the availability of low-interest loans in the barter currency allows business to realise increased sales without the usual increases in operating costs.

An interesting example of such systems is the Wirtschaftring (WIR). Established in Switzerland in 1934, the WIR has handled over an equivalent of two billion Swiss Francs in trading in the barter currency (also called the WIR) for its 60,000 members.

To join the WIR, companies (only companies can become members), must pay an entrance fee, a yearly fee and a fee for each transaction handled by the system. Most of these fees are paid in Swiss Francs. The WIR has a for-profit, professional bank which manages client accounts and issues credit. Managers' salaries are paid in the national currency generated through members' fees. The barter currency represents the value of the goods and services being traded. Like LETS, the WIR is simply a unit of measurement in a member's account - there is no paper note. In order to simplify the valuation and taxation of goods traded, the WIR's value is officially set equivalent to the Swiss Franc. Normally, goods and services traded between member companies are valued partially in the national currency, with the remainder in WIR.

Members who hold the appropriate collateral can apply for low interest WIR loans. The most popular way of securing collateral is with a second mortgage on a house or business premises. It is essential to request collateral to comply with Swiss banking laws. The credit committee restricts the total value of outstanding loans to one-third of the systems' annual turnover in order to maintain the value of the WIR.

Participating companies have found that WIR currency is often more easily earned than spent. Over-accumulation of WIR, accompanied by declining income in Swiss Francs, can create serious liquidity problems. Obviously, Swiss Francs are still required to pay for such major expenses as rent, salaries and insurance premiums. The result is a black market where WIRs are traded for Swiss Francs at rates 30% below the official exchange rate. The loss of value of the WIR in these cases may make loans in WIR more expensive than interest-bearing loans from a conventional bank.

Barter and Community Currency Systems

Modern barter systems are, in fact, not true barter. There is no direct one-to-one exchange of goods. Like community currency systems, barter systems use their own unique currencies as an exchange medium and in some systems, as in a LETS, members can create their own credit. Although based upon the same operating principles, barter systems should be viewed as distinct from community currency systems. The most notable distinction is the difference in attitudes towards community development. Barter systems are guided primarily by profit. The system is not designed to prevent economic leakage's from one region or community to another. A further difference lies in the valuation mechanism. Although not by definition an ethical trading system, there is pressure reported by LETS members to value labour fairly, instead of adhering strictly to the profit-maximising pricing mechanisms of the regular economy.

It has been argued that community currency systems should use the bartering approach to include more businesses and move away from the 'social favours only' trade image. At the same time, barter network participants might be interested in the smaller-scale but reliable local market provided by a community currency system. If a multiple community trading format were to be used, a 'business-only' regional barter system could exist alongside both purely community-based systems and community-business systems without allowing leakages from one system or one region to another (see 1.3 Multiple Community Trading, MultiLETS). Income from community-business trading could be used by businesses to pay wages. Currently, this is not possible as individual workers are generally not allowed to join the barter systems.

Many LETS developers see the integration of business as a prime objective. The rapid expansion of barter trade shows that when a sufficient number of members have joined a community currency system, there is great potential to generate economic activity that otherwise would not have occurred. This demands that the elements of barter trading which have allowed its widespread dissemination be better understood. The LETS-like Noppes system in Amsterdam has set up a professional barter circle, which exists alongside the present monoLETS. Noppes is one of the biggest systems in the world with over 800 members growing at a rate of 60 new members per month. The barter circle is scheduled to begin trading in June of 1998, and, initially, activities will be focused on a relatively small area (the Amsterdam region). It will be set up under another name and use different currency units since the existing Noppes system has a non-commercial, 'alternative' image. Unlike most barter systems, the barter circle will not exclude individual members, including the Noppes members, from participating.

 

1.3 Multiple Community Trading

The design of a community currency system might be seen as an inherent limitation to external trade since trading can only be realised within those boundaries defined by participants. It is possible that there are limited resources available for local currency trading or that there are needed products which are only available in another community. If one wants to trade beyond their community one has to rely, once again, on the national currency. Is there a way to extend the boundaries of local currency usage without creating leakages from one region to another? Some care is required in answering this question.

The immediate temptation, if two or more community currencies are equivalent to the national currency, is to allow one currency to be traded with the other at par. This has been called 'intertrading'. The danger, however, is in replicating in the community currency what we dislike about the federal currency; namely, the tendency of money to pool where profits are highest. If, for example, Community B started a very successful business, it might 'suck' all of the community currency units, and therefore the trading activity, out of Community A before it had a chance to develop its own small business sector. Intertrading causes a de facto merging of two community currency systems, despite the use of two distinct currencies. The accounts of each community will, in all likelihood, not balance and therefore leakages from one community to the other can emerge.

The second way to connect two separate community currency systems is to allow each system to maintain an account in the other. If, for example, Ariya of Community A were to receive a kilogram of bananas from Bob of Community B, Bob's account would be credited (in Community B's currency units), while the corresponding debit would be made to the aggregate Community A account (again, in Community B's currency units). The members of Community A would then have a future obligation to render goods/services to the members of Community B. This has been called 'interlinking'. The problem here is that individual account holders in Community A are distanced from their systems' commitment to Community B. If trade is not backed by personal commitment, the opportunity to 'get something for nothing' increases. Eventually, faith may be lost, either by the members of Community B who decide that they will no longer trade with members of indebted Community A, or, by members of Community A, who view with suspicion the accumulated debt of their system.

MultiLETS

To overcome these difficulties, Michael Linton, Richard Kaye and Ernie Yacub developed multiLETS. The multiLETS concept means that individuals will hold separate accounts in both the community currency system of their immediate community and in other overlapping, neighbouring or 'umbrella' systems. Whereas before, Community A was obligated to Community B when Ariya received bananas from Bob, with multiLETS it is Ariya herself who has a personal commitment to Community B. This, however, requires two things: Firstly, that Ariya holds accounts with both systems (or with System A and an 'umbrella' system) and, secondly, that computer processing is available to handle the increased complexity of transactions. This latter requirement has been met by the creation of a 'registry'. A registry is a "not-for-profit administrative facility which processes transactions and produces statements for account-holders in two or more LETSystems which choose to use the services it offers."

The requirement to register transactions, effectively rules out the use of the multiLETS concept in an HOURS environment. Several communities which have implemented their own HOURS-based community currency systems have considered allowing trade with Ithaca HOURS. However, "there was a fear that other communities' HOURS would be sucked into Ithaca due to its comparative size." Following the preceding analysis of inter-trading, this possibility seems very likely. One alternative might be to print a unique currency which could be used solely for inter-system trade. The new trading boundaries might be a bio-region, a state, or an amalgamation of independent communities. This, however, would entail greater expense and might create undue confusion. Could, for example, a community currency be traded for a regional currency? If not, how could this be prevented?

In North America, multiLETS remains stuck at the conceptual stage. Attempted start-ups in Courtenay, Victoria, Vancouver, Ottawa and Toronto have lacked the necessary support to become self-sustaining.

In the United Kingdom, in 1994, an ambitious project, referred to as LETSgo, was undertaken to initiate a multiLETS in Manchester. The registry was intended to replace the several existing monoLETS in the Greater Manchester region, of which Manchester LETS, with 700 members, was the largest. Training schemes were set up to educate individuals who would play vital roles in getting communities involved not only in the gmLETS (Greater Manchester LETS) but also to set up multiLETS nation-wide. It was expected that businesses would be attracted to the registry by the possibility of using the 'prime' currency, the 'gm pound', rather than being restricted to trading in a community-specific currency. After exhausting considerable effort and funding, participation levels have been disappointing. In fact, despite the establishment of an elegant system, there is no trading taking place in the gmLETS registry. Currently Manchester LETS is operating as a monoLETS using the 'Bobbin' as their currency. After a setback triggered by the confusion surrounding the establishment of gmLETS, when numbers dropped drastically, Manchester LETS membership has recovered to previous levels (approximately 600 accountholders).

Besides Manchester LETS, there are 6 other monoLETS operating in the region. According to Siobhan Harpur, one of the initiators of Manchester LETS and Creative Living Centre LETS, none of the Manchester systems have any formal arrangements for members to trade with each other. Most people who want to trade in more than one system are members of each system. There are informal arrangements between such people. For example, members of Manchester LETS who know that Siobhan is a member of both Manchester LETS and Creative Living Centre LETS, "will get (her) to buy things for them and they'll pay (her) in Bobbins (Manchester LETS currency)". Despite its support from key LETS developers, the Registry concept has not been accepted by the general membership of the monoLETS in Manchester. It is the authors' feeling that members have chosen to go their own way after the confusion and drastic change experienced with the LETSgo project.

East Kent LETS has gone through the process of transforming four monoLETS into a multiLETS. Members can trade between communities using the 'umbrella' currency, the East Kent Unit (EKU). New members automatically receive two accounts. The administrators of individual communities continue to create directories and organise local market days, while the accounting in either currency ('individual' or 'umbrella'), is handled by one central administration. This has resulted in the reduction of transaction fees and a decreased workload for volunteers. Despite the presence of a multiLETS, most trading (over 95 %) takes place within individual LETS.

Apart from more successful multiLETS such as East Kent, it is the authors' view that generally the administrators of individual LETS fear losing control of an initiative that they have invested a great deal of time and effort into. This may be indicative of a misunderstanding of the precepts upon which multiLETS operates. There may be a mistaken belief that multiLETS poses the same threat to individual LETS systems' stability and autonomy as 'intertrading' or 'interlinking'.

These perceptions of multiLETS must be taken into consideration before implementation. In theory, once an 'umbrella' system is in place, there is little need for local administrators. Volunteer effort would still be required to publish the 'offers/requests' directory and to carry out education and awareness activities, however, transactions and account records could be handled at the 'umbrella' level. In practice, this ignores the political reality - the presence of both stubborn resistance to change and well-grounded fears of undemocratic forces assuming control over what had initially been a community effort.

It is the authors' opinion that the development of multiLETS has preceded the preparedness of individual systems to accept it. As long as system growth in individual communities has yet to reach significant levels, there is relatively little demand for multi-community trading. MultiLETS proponents would respond that the inclusion of multi-community trading is critical in making community currency systems relevant for a larger proportion of the general population. The concept is sound - namely that currency should follow the nature of goods traded without causing leakages from one community to another. As demand for multi-community trade increases, multiLETS and similar systems should evolve naturally.

Talents

The Talent system in Switzerland operates as a nation-wide monoLETS. Only one currency is used and accounts are handled centrally. Multi-community trading can take place via intertrading. Despite this capacity, over 95% of trading takes place within individual regions rather than between them. Intra-regional trading predominates because regional administrators print directories and organise market days, but also because the majority of trading involves services. In January, 1998, the system had 762 members nation-wide and 866,516 Talents had been exchanged over 4,057 transactions. It is not clear whether leakages can be avoided once there is greater demand for inter-region trading, or if some kind of control will need to be devised to prevent unbalanced resource flows from one region to another. Certainly, the Talent administrators have no plans to set up a multiLETS. There is no call for more autonomy from the individual regions and, indeed, some LETS promoters in Switzerland would like to see the system increase its trading with neighbouring countries.

Exchange Rates Between Community Currencies

Renato Pichler from Talents Switzerland has developed a method to allow trading between the nation-wide Swiss Talent and the Talents in Italy and Austria. The different Talents are all at par with their respective currencies. Exchange rates between the various Talents are determined by comparing the purchasing power of each currency using a basket of goods whose composition and weighting is determined by the membership.

The problem with this method is that there is room left for speculation. The exchange rate is determined by taking the average value of a number of different goods; this does not mean, however, that the exchange rate will be an accurate reflection of the relative prices for all goods. A speculator could buy a lot of a single item which is relatively undervalued in currency A and then sell it in another region where it is overvalued in currency B. The revenues in currency B could then be exchanged for currency A and the cycle begun again. If, for example, the Talents price of potatoes in Switzerland was relatively cheap using the Italian-Swiss Talents exchange rate, there would be an incentive to transport potatoes form Switzerland to Italy. This would be both damaging for potato producers in Italy and jeopardise the credibility of the system.

To counteract the danger of speculation, the administrative body of the whole intertrading system would have to put controls on trades being made. This planning and monitoring requirement would be the price paid for an exchange rate system which facilitates increased trading opportunities between communities. So far no such trading exists.


2. Operating Issues

As with any economy, a community currency system incurs administrative costs, therefore, a system must be devised to raise revenues. Furthermore, members of the community may want to either encourage/discourage economic growth or support a variety of community initiatives. The various methods to accomplish these goals are discussed below. Their impact on inflation is subsequently examined.

 

2.1 Fiscal Tools

Fees

Within LETS circles, some debate exists as to the best method to raise the community currency required to cover administrative costs. The argument is between the proponents of 'transaction fees' (members accounts are debited a small percentage of the value of every trade, or a constant amount per trade, which is credited to a central administrative account) and those in favour of 'flat fees' (each member's account, whether in a positive or negative balance, is debited an equal share of a periodic administrative charge, irrespective of trading activities).

The evolution of Guelph LETS was similar to that in numerous communities. Initially, a five percent transaction fee (up to a maximum of fifteen Green Dollars per year) was levied. Funds were accumulated and paid out as needed for administrative expenses. Any excess income was given out in the form of grants to community organisations as decided at a general meeting. Experience with transaction fees led many members to feel that they acted as a disincentive to trade - essentially punishing those who were active traders and rewarding those who were not. Guelph LETS now uses flat fees, as do most other LETS systems spoken to. The growing consensus is that flat fees based on a 'cost of service' principle provide the greatest transparency and the least disincentive to trade. The former point is particularly important in communities where administrative responsibilities are not shared by a broad cross-section of members.

In an HOURS environment, in the absence of member accounts, the only method available to cover administrative costs is through the sale of advertising space in the HOURS 'offers/request' directory. Some might ask why not simply print more HOURS to pay the bills? Paul Glover maintains that it is better to seek federal currency donations or employ volunteer effort rather than risk the loss of confidence and inflation that might follow from such a policy. This reflects a more general attitude held by HOURS proponents that systems should look externally for administrative support while LETS has enshrined a 'pay-for-work' principle.

Budget Spending

The opposite of the taxation issue is that of budget spending. Profligate spending on administrative tasks, without the necessary accompanying taxation, has nearly meant the collapse of several LETS. Toronto LETS central account had reached a negative balance in the thousands of Green Dollars before there was a loss of confidence and a nearly fifty percent decline in membership (see 2.3 Inflation, Internal Inflation). Accordingly, most LETS have now taken steps to prevent overspending, including a year-end settling of the administrative account and a separation in year-end trading summaries of 'real' trade and 'busy work'.

Both LETS and HOURS-based systems use grants to community organisations to stimulate trading activity. LETS communities balance the outflow from the central account by charging a flat fee to members; HOURS communities establish what percentage of non-grant hours may be issued as grants (11% in Ithaca, New York; 5% in Kingston, Ontario). In both cases, the mutual agreement of system participants is required. Although fulfilling a valuable role in supporting community projects, administrators need to be aware of the potential of community currency grants to slow the process towards sustainability. Rather than expanding trade by creating their own credit, members may become reliant on tax-and-spend injections. This would lead to rapid increases in trading subsequent to the issuing of a grant followed by a period of stagnation. For a LETS to become self-propelled, it is important for members to accept that negative balances are healthy and, in fact, vital for trade.

 

2.2 Monetary Tools

Loans

While LETS systems rely more heavily on the fiscal tools of taxation and spending, HOURS administrators encourage economic growth via monetary policy.

In Ithaca, up to 5% of HOURS issued (other than as loans themselves) can be lent out as interest-free loans. No single loan can exceed 120 HOURS, and decisions regarding eligibility are made at monthly potlucks. This policy can be either tightened or relaxed depending on the growth goals of the system.

In principle, LETS allow their members to create their own unlimited credit. However, in practice, many systems have set a limit on negative account balances. Kitchener-Waterloo LETS, in Ontario, uses -500G$ as a limit. Peterborough LETS uses a more strict -250$G. The Talent system has set its credit limit at -700 Talents, apart from the social organisations who can go further into debt as agreed by all the members. In the Noppes system the credit limit is equal to the amount that a member has earned in the last 12 months. The reverse holds true as well; members' positive balances can not exceed what they have spent over the previous year.

In this way, members can be confident that no individual will receive a disproportionate amount of goods and services and then leave the system without 'repaying'. While, conceptually at least, such losses could be absorbed by the larger community and have little or no effect on the value of an unlimited currency, in practice, the perception that a few are exploiting the many could lead to a loss of confidence in the currency. Furthermore, the departure of negative account holders upsets the balance of trade. There will be less incentive to trade as positive balances (representing a commitment to receive goods or services) outweigh negative balances (representing an obligation to provide goods or services). This imbalance may need to be remedied by the imposition of a 'free rider' tax; essentially, sharing the debit of the departing member amongst the remaining members.

Virtually all LETS systems have their members agree to repay any negative account balances in federal currency upon departure from the system. Both Manchester LETS and the Noppes system actively remind members who plan to leave the community of their obligation to settle their account. It is difficult, however, to imagine that these actions have any 'teeth' in the case of intentionally delinquent members. One further option is for the system to prepare for such events before they occur through the imposition of an insurance tax which could be used to maintain the overall balance of the system.

Money Supply

The second monetary option available to HOURS administrators is direct manipulation of the money supply. The authors discovered that this issue is a 'black box' for LETS practitioners - 'Debit-zero accounting doesn't require any manipulation of the money supply; money is created as needed. Just how do HOURS administrators know how much money to print?' - so it is probably worthwhile to spend some time explaining it here.

Community members wishing to participate in HOURS trading fill out a form which includes personal information as well as space to list offers and requests. This is sent to the administrator, where the pertinent information is placed in the next 'offers/requests' directory, and a pre-agreed upon number of HOURS notes are mailed to the new participant (two HOURS in Ithaca). There is tacit, though some argue for the need for formalised, agreement that, in return for the right to use these 'free' HOURS notes, recipients must, in turn, accept them for the goods and/or services which they offer to the community. Whether explicit or not, what this means is that HOURS notes are backed by the commitment of each participant to accept them; if participants refuse to accept them, for whatever reason, their value diminishes. Conversely, the more people that agree to accept them for a greater variety of goods and services, the more the value of the note increases. (This is also true of LETS trading units.)

Every so often (eight months, equivalent to four issues of the directory, in Ithaca) participants may update both personal information and 'offers/requests' listings. Continued inclusion of outdated offers and requests is an excellent way to frustrate traders and destroy the credibility of the system as a whole. In return for updated information, participants receive a pre-agreed upon amount of HOURS notes (one or two HOURS in Ithaca). These updates are not mandatory. Furthermore, the HOURS administrative members phone participants on a rotating basis, approximately every two months, in an attempt to keep trading information up to date.

To tighten the money supply, HOURS administrators can:

To expand the money supply, the opposite occurs. Administrators can:

Undoubtedly LETS proponents are unsatisfied with this explanation. 'Yes, but how do they know when to increase/decrease the HOURS supply and by how much?' There simply is no secret formula. In informal discussions, administrators ask key participants (those whose trading volume is significant) if they have more HOURS than they can spend. If the answer of a single organisation is yes, then the first step is to help them to spend their HOURS (as outlined in 1.2 Integrating Business, The HOURS Environment). If several organisations have a surplus of HOURS, then steps are taken to tighten the money supply. In this respect, HOURS administrators are much like US Federal Reserve Chair Alan Greenspan - they make a best guess and hope that severe problems do not arise. In small systems, where the money supply is slowly expanded and carefully monitored, there should not be unmanageable supply problems. Indeed, in those systems spoken with, this is the case. However, it would be fair to assert, that if an HOURS system reached a significant size and the HOURS supply was expanded beyond the demand for goods and services, there is nothing in place to check inflation or waning confidence. This stresses the need for a transparent process of money supply manipulation and competent leadership.

 Demurrage

The term 'demurrage' is used to describe charges which are levied on positive account balances--in effect, a negative interest rate. The concept originates from Silvio Gesell's assertion that money is a public good which serves the function of exchange. This justifies a fee being levied on its use. Money should not serve as both a medium of exchange and a store of value at the same time.

In his book entitled, "The Natural Economic Order", published in 1913, Gesell outlined his ideas for monetary reform. He developed a 'stamp scrip' system which was intended to increase the velocity of currency circulation by encouraging participants to spend rather than save. A note, or 'scrip', was designed which had 52 spaces on the reverse side, one for each week of the year. The face value of the scrip would only be maintained if a stamp, costing 2 per cent of the face value of the note, was affixed to the space on the back corresponding to a particular week. Participants spent the scrip quickly, in order to avoid paying the costs of the stamp, thereby preventing hoarding. Stamp scrips were in common use in Gesell's time and gained popularity in Europe and North America during the depression in the 1930s.

Currently the Talent system (see 1.3 Multiple Community Trading), which draws inspiration from the writings of Gesell, levies a 0.5 % monthly charge on positive account balances. Furthermore, Talents notes are printed with an expiry date, after which the note is worthless. Those holding the note as the expiry date approaches must exchange the note for a 'new' one; this provides the incentive to spend the note rather than go through the inconvenience of redeeming it.

Thomas Greco, author of "New Money for Healthy Communities", disagrees with Gesellians that fees should be levied on creditors only (in the form of a demurrage charge); he insists that they should be levied equally on debtors and creditors (in the form of a regular administrative charge). Greco claims that when a local currency or scrip is properly issued and its supply is not artificially restricted, there should be no incentive for hoarding. The demurrage which the stamp or an expiry date represents is therefore unnecessary. In similar fashion, other LETS proponents argue that there is no need to punish creditors because local currency is not scarce. Therefore, others do not need the credit that someone else has created - they can create it for themselves.

It could be argued that demurrage charges introduce unnecessary complexity. They may be seen as a disincentive to join a community currency system - essentially, fining those who successfully save money. Noppes, another system which uses demurrage fees based on Gesellian thought, tries to mitigate this risk. The positive account ceiling beyond which demurrage is levied is based on a participant's previous twelve months' trading volume. The more trading a business does, the higher its ceiling and, therefore, the less likely it is that demurrage fees will be levied. The presence of a limit on negative account balances and charges on those who exceed it, means that debtors and creditors both pay a user fee for money in the Noppes system.

Having considered the arguments for and against implementing demurrage charges, their use might be considered where problems have arisen due to hoarding (in fiat systems), slow circulation or an overabundance of positive account balances (in mutual credit systems).

 

2.3 Inflation

Tying the Community Currency

In North America as well as in Europe, virtually all community currency systems have tied their currency to the national currency, mainly to make it easier for members to value their transactions. Tying also simplifies accounting and tax calculations for participating businesses. According to the LETS design manual, the LETS currency (often called "Green Dollars") must be tied to the national currency if it is to be officially called a LETSystem. HOURS systems are less strict about this requirement. National currency equivalents are given as a guideline, however, members are encouraged to determine their own prices outside of the market system. A Kingston HOUR, for example, is equal to twelve dollars Canadian.

Tying the local currency to the national currency has one significant implication. If buyers and sellers expect the parity to be maintained, the value of a community currency must follow the ups and downs of the national currency. Some might argue that this is not a problem as the value of the community currency unit depends on the availability of goods and services, and, therefore, the purchasing power of the local currency remains constant (remember, local currency is not scarce). However, as Richard Kaye argues, if those in credit see the value of what they have done in the past depreciate, this will limit the total of goods and services they will sell to others for the purpose of savings, which in turn will limit the contribution the LETS currency can make to the local economy. Kaye concludes that, " beating inflation requires a monetary standard". Inflation was not perceived as a problem in the LETS visited, however the Dollar, Pound, and Franc have been relatively stable when compared to the Peso, Baht or Rupiah.

Trying to avoid these potential instabilities requires the creation of an independent standard for valuing goods and services. One option is to tie the local currency to the value of a single good or a basket of goods. Although it can be expected that the value of this basket stays relatively stable over a long period of time, whenever there is an increase in the value of this commodity (or commodities) relative to wages this will cause a slump in trade.

Alternately, the local currency could be based on an hourly wage rate as decided by the community. This way the money supply will be limited only by what people credibly promise to do for each other rather than by the availability of a single commodity or basket of commodities or other products. The standardisation through an hourly wage is practised in very few LETS in the UK but, certainly, the concept appeals to many systems. In most LETS, wage levels are already higher than market levels.

Most community currency systems development groups state in their promotion leaflets that it is up to members themselves to decide how they want to value goods and services. Conceptually this seems the most ethical way of dealing with prices as these prices would better represent community norms and values. However, the inexperience of community members in valuing what they buy and sell independently of the market makes this option difficult, at least in the near future. It is the authors' belief that the independent valuation of goods is a long process requiring education and practical experience in local trading.

In "Hometown Money", Paul Glover agrees that one way to deal with inflation is to calculate prices independently in HOURS, however, "... this could succeed only to the extent that needs can be fulfilled locally." If most goods and services continue to come from outside the community, then an independent valuation is meaningless - prices will still have to be paid in the equivalent to inflationary US dollars. The other option put forward by Glover is to, "... declare the Ithaca HOUR equal to a 1991 US ten dollar bill." While solving the problem of inflation, this solution would be difficult in practice; periodically, an inflation coefficient would have to be calculated. For example, rather than the present use of ten dollars as a guideline, one HOUR's nominal value might equal, say, $US12.60, although the real value would remain equal to ten 1991 dollars. This would complicate pricing decisions, particularly where split-pricing is involved.

There is another, less visible, exploitative relationship to which a tied system is susceptible. In a one-to-one relationship between the local currency and the national currency the two currencies are in a market relationship, with various rates of exchange. If the convertibility advantage of the regular currency were played off against the limited utility of the community currency, the result could be that buyers who have nothing to offer except community currency as a payment medium would have to compensate for this disadvantage by offering a higher price. To illustrate: a bakery sells bread for 100 dollars in regular currency and for 110 dollars at a currency proportion of 80:20. The application of this arrangement will very quickly lead to the parallel currency coming into disrepute as a 'poor people's currency' liable to exploitation, unattractive to hold.

Internal Inflation

Apart from the inflation caused by external pressures on community currencies, there are internal factors which play a role in the valuation of the community currency unit. Several system administrators have tried to stimulate trading by issuing extra credits beyond those generated from taxation (see also 2.1. Fiscal Tools). In a LETS, this internally generated inflation can be defined as the excess of debits over credits. This excess, an 'artificial injection' into the community currency system, can be stated as a percentage of the total monthly trading volume as follows:

total trading volume for the month = central account end-of-month balance (debits over credits)

This influx of unbacked money has the potential to raise false expectations as energy available has been created where in fact none can be expected. Furthermore, influxes of unbacked money often to go to some people and not to others; this can create animosity, which was the experience of VicLETS in Victoria, British Columbia. Despite these risks, there is no conclusive evidence that unbacked injections must lead to currency depreciation. This depends largely on the confidence in the local currency. If confidence declines and community currency prices begin to rise, administrators should certainly try to balance the accounts through taxes or at least check the growth of the surplus by eliminating local currency grants.

Depreciation does not have to be caused by money supply led inflation. A further cause can be an insufficient supply or diversity of goods and services available for trade. If members find themselves unable to spend the local currency units they earn, they may lose confidence in the system and, consequently, the value of the local currency may be adversely affected.


3. LETS, HOURS or Both?

3.1 LETS and HOURS

LETS requires that members register accounts, while HOURS systems do not. From here the fundamental differences originate. LETS members can create as much credit as is required at the time of an exchange, regardless of their account balance (see 2.2 Monetary Tools, Loans). Community members who use HOURS are limited, at any one time, to the amount of notes they have in their possession. They can, conceivably, obtain an interest-free loan from their local HOURS bank, however, this must be planned in advance of the transaction and there is always the possibility of being turned down.

Through members' accounts, LETS administrators are able to track the impact of the system as well as levy fees which are used to support administrative costs such as printing, transportation, etc.. The creators of HOURS have sought to avoid both the administrative costs themselves and the taxation that is necessary to support them. HOURS systems sacrifice the ability to monitor and tax for the anonymity and freedom from taxation which freely circulating notes afford. It is perhaps not coincidental that the attitudes towards central regulation inherent in the systems reflect similar views towards state intervention in their respective countries of origin.

The implications of this difference in attitude for system administration are important. While both systems require the creation of an 'offers/requests' bulletin, LETS further requires that all transactions be recorded and that periodic updates of individual members' accounts be distributed. This places additional time and resource demands upon administrators and/or volunteers.

The desire for efficient management of these accounts precipitated the creation of LETS software. All but one of the systems interviewed in Canada was using QLETS. In the UK most LETS use mLETS or an adapted version of it. Problems with both QLETS and mLETS software were universal and varied from dissatisfaction with output to complete frustration caused by a system crash. The general consensus, however, was that the software is improving and crises are becoming less numerous. Manchester LETS will start using a new software program developed by LETSolutions. Talents and Noppes have developed their own software.

In every instance, LETS practitioners indicated that, at various times, staff had been overwhelmed by the administrative load. Several individuals in North America held the belief that HOURS systems require fewer administrative resources and had gone so far as to consider converting to HOURS. This characterisation, on the part of LETS participants, of HOURS systems as 'low-tech, low-input' should be tempered by the fact that HOURS systems require the creation and management of a durable form of currency.

As earlier mentioned, LETS administrators are able to debit members' accounts and credit a central account to pay for needed services in the community currency. Further revenue, both in community currency units and federal dollars, is generated through the sale of advertising space in the 'offers/requests' bulletin. This latter method is the only option available to HOURS administrators. While both systems have been successful in raising an adequate amount of community currency, most groups, not surprisingly, reported a shortfall in federal currency. In almost all cases, fund-raisers and charitable donations played a crucial role. National currency is required to reach the point where systems can be self-propelled - to pay a part-time salesperson to increase small business participation, for example. But until systems play a more significant role in the economic affairs of a community, it has proven difficult to find the necessary funds.

The requirement for LETS members to register an account plays a further role in system growth. To register, new members must make contact with a group which may (or may not) be stigmatised in the community. Alternately, existing members have to expend precious time and resources in outreach activities. HOURS systems involve lower barriers to entry; community members can participate simply by opting to receive their change at the bakery in HOURS, and then spending it at the barber. This appears to be a more natural way of defining the boundaries of a trading community.

Their closer resemblance to conventional currency makes HOURS notes more easily understood and used by both individuals and organisations. In contrast, the 'invisible accounting' system employed by LETS can be difficult for new members to conceptualise. However, as easily as HOURS are traded, so they are easily left in a drawer (like jars of pennies) with no way for administrators to revive them.

The evidence concerning growth potential is by no means conclusive. Of the systems visited by the author, only one has achieved trading volumes which are significant in terms of the larger economic picture. LETS systems which have enjoyed rapid growth periods have subsequently been plagued by administrative problems leading to a marked decline in trading volume and membership.

 

3.2 Hybrid Systems

In system design terms, the most important feature of LETS is the ability of its members to create credit, while the greatest strength of an HOURS system is its ease of use. Is there a way to have our 'community currency cake' and eat it, too? Guelph LETS and the Tlaloc bank attempt to unite mutual credit and interest free fiat, the former in a high-tech setting, the latter in the low-tech environment of Mexico City.

Guelph LETS prints 'Green Dollar' notes which members can withdraw at a local business. The member's account is debited the face value of the notes while the corresponding credit is made to the central account. While Guelph LETS maintains a single central account, conceivably, for greater clarity, this 'Green Dollar Notes' account could be separated from the administrative account. In return for keeping a record of the serial numbers and names of recipients, the business which distributes the notes enjoys increased walk-in traffic.

The goal of circulating Green Dollar notes in Guelph is to attract businesses with a trading format they are more accustomed to and to facilitate impulse/small trades. Larger transactions can still be phoned in to the administrator. One very important difference, however, between Guelph LETS and conventional LETS is the opening up of trade with non-members. As in an HOURS system, community members who wish to participate may do so without having to open an account. Trades between members and non-members (or non-members and non-members) are not recorded. After the initial entry described above, the notes will freely circulate until such time as they end up in the hands of a member who decides that they would like to deposit accumulated notes in their account. At this point, the member's account is credited the face value of the Green Dollars deposited and the corresponding debit is made to the 'Green Dollar Notes' account. These notes can, of course, then be re-circulated to another member who makes a withdrawal. The balance in the 'Green Dollar Notes' account (= total value of notes issued - total value of notes redeemed) is, theoretically, equal to the value of Green Dollar notes in circulation at any one time.

One might wonder why a non-member would want to join a system they could participate in without having to go through the annoyance of registering and the additional requirement to pay taxes. Only by registering are participants able to create their own credit, either by withdrawing notes or by trading with a negative account balance. Account-holding members can also deposit accumulated notes. Furthermore, members are included in the 'offers/requests' bulletin which provides an effective way to advertise one's goods or services.

This added convenience does not come without the introduction of a few new wrinkles. Whereas previously a LETS administrator knew the exact volume of trading at any point in time, such calculations are now somewhat complicated. While transactions which are phoned in can be included on members' accounts, trades involving Green Dollar notes go unrecorded. Unlike imaginary accounting units, real paper notes get dog-eared, destroyed and lost. An estimate of the attrition of the notes supply needs to be made and a corresponding amount re-injected into the community through, for example, grants to social organisations. Finally, the creation of notes requires additional time and resources from administrators and/or volunteers. This further effort may be at least partially offset by a decline in the number of transactions which need to be recorded in individual members' accounts. Guelph LETS has minimised costs through the use of photocopied notes, rather than using off-set printing. Every solution brings a new problem, as this one may raise the spectre of forgery.

It is important to note that the Green Dollar notes are unproven. The notes were first issued less than one year ago and the Guelph system is still very small in size, approximately 50 members. Recently, a Canadian government grant was given to Guelph LETS to hire a staff member to market the system to local business. The coming year should prove to be a litmus test both for Guelph LETS as a whole and for the Green Dollar trial.

The Tlaloc Bank works along similar principles to Guelph LETS. Members are able to obtain sheets of Tlaloc notes (1 Tlaloc = 1 hour of social labour) which are debited to their account. These notes are signed into existence when first traded and, subsequently, signed on the back of the note by the receiving party for ten 'rounds' of trading. After the notes have been used in ten separate transactions, they must be returned to the central administrator to be exchanged for a new note of equal value. This can be done by either members or non-members. Presumably, the old note is either kept for accounting purposes or is destroyed - it is not re-circulated.

This raises two issues. First, does the necessity to retire the note after ten trades not add, unnecessarily, to printing costs? This seems particularly relevant in a low-tech setting. Secondly, are we introducing a precise method of measuring trading volume (value of notes retired multiplied by ten), which is, in fact, imprecise? Would it not be likely, for example, that the note, after receiving nine signatures on the back, is used perpetually without adding the tenth signature, in order to avoid the hassle of redeeming it? More research in Mexico should provide definitive answers to such questions.

Whereas non-note transactions occurring between system members are phoned in to the administrator in the Guelph LETS system, members of the Tlaloc Bank use a system of paper receipts. Traders carry receipt books with them, and after each transaction fill out:

a receipt for the giver
a receipt for the receiver
a receipt for the central administrator which is dropped off at a collection box

The manager of the Tlaloc Bank, Luis Lopezllera, reports low acceptance of the receipt system. It is the authors' opinion that the cumbersome routine of filling out a form in triplicate and the dissimilarity to more familiar cash trading are responsible for this fact.

At least two other systems that the authors are aware of operate hybrid systems similar to Guelph LETS and the Tlaloc Bank. Talents, in Switzerland, prints notes which can be withdrawn from member accounts and used for trade with both members and non-members. Unlike Guelph LETS, the notes have a scrip (see 2.2 Monetary Tools, Demurrage). The Noppes system in Amsterdam has two kinds of notes; one for the Noppes markets and one which can be exchanged with the national currency.

3.3 Community Fit

It would be a gross oversimplification to describe the various elements of different community currency systems as 'right' or 'wrong'; rather, we might consider how amenable these elements are to both the environment and the goals of a particular community.

The capacity for mutual credit creation lends itself to situations where access to credit is limited. LETS members can start trading with an account balance of zero or even a negative account balance. HOURS do not allow for self-created credit, however, participants can obtain an interest-free loan from their local HOURS bank.

Synthesis systems are able to provide credit to members, while, at the same time, attracting non-members to the system with easily accessible notes.

The familiar format of HOURS is more quickly understood and employed, particularly where there is little or no experience with cheques and credit cards. HOURS appear to be more easily absorbed by local small business for trade in goods as well as services. This fosters cross-sectional growth within a community. Our limited study shows LETS to be more individual service-oriented, though, it remains to be seen whether current attempts for a more pro-business approach of LETS stakeholders will yield significant results. Theoretically, hybrid systems should allow for trade in both goods and services, however, experience is very limited.

LETS administrators are able to debit members' accounts and credit a central account to pay for needed services such as printing costs, transportation, etc., in the community currency. Further revenue, both in community currency units and federal dollars, is generated through the sale of advertising space in the 'offers/requests' bulletin. This latter method, which seems impractical in contexts where business promotion efforts are minimal, is the only option available to HOURS administrators.

While a monoLETS is easily managed with pen and paper, multiLETS requires the advent of computer use. This requirement makes multiLETS prohibitive for low-tech or low-income settings. Certainly, if a multiLETS were to be attempted in a low-tech setting, more responsibility would fall on the individual to monitor their account balance in various systems. While the issuance of notes does not require database-literate administrators, it does require fairly sophisticated printing processes. The lack of a multiple community, or 'umbrella', trading system means that HOURS will not be as effective in attracting individuals or organisations who perform a large percentage of their trading outside of the HOURS community. Synthesis systems appear to be adaptable to either low-tech/low income or high-tech/high-income regions as developments in Guelph and Mexico City demonstrate.

The requirement to register an account will be more acceptable in tight-knit communities which intend to develop long-term membership. HOURS notes are better able to bridge disparate social groups, including short-term or transitory individuals, but do not have the 'holding power' of a LETS. HOURS are preferred by communities whose political leanings are more decentralised and whose members place a high priority on personal privacy. Synthesis systems allow participants to choose between their support of the more easily monitored trading via the phone or paper receipts, and the untraceable use of freely circulating notes. Similarly, in the conventional economy, we can use cheques/credit cards or we may carry cash. There is no perfect world; even in the HOURS system, there must be some form of elected committee to evaluate loan applications and manage the money supply.


4. Key Success Factors

4.1 The People

4.1.1 The 'Champion'

One constant with the community currency systems contacted was the presence of a 'champion' - an individual who first introduces the concept, works endlessly on its implementation and provides motivation and leadership.

Paul Glover, the founder of Ithaca HOURS is often cited as an example. Paul was the recipient of a three-year domestic Peace Corps grant given to start a support programme for the low-income residents of Tompkins County, New York. According to community members, Paul worked "15 hour days" in his efforts to strengthen the Ithaca community both through the HOURS trading system and other initiatives.

Andy Ryrie, of East Kent LETS, has put considerable effort in setting up Canterbury LETS and has also been one of the prime forces behind the creation of a multiLETS which brings together four different LETSystems. Previously he did this work in his spare time, but presently he receives funding from the British government to promote the development of LETS in the area. Without his numerous visits and presentations, the LETS concept would probably not have caught on as it has.

Champions must remain conscious of how they are perceived by members of the greater community. Just as a well-respected, personable, highly-skilled champion is the touchstone of success, so an individual who is viewed with suspicion or who lacks interpersonal skills can relegate an initiative to the fringes. Unfortunately, the latter scenario is not uncommon. There are more than a few examples of community currency systems which are judged more by the character of the champion than by either the merits of the concept or the achievements of the system in place. One way to avoid placing the burden of success or failure on one person's shoulders is to seek out an organisation or institution to play the champion role:

After participation in an initial attempt to establish a LETS in Kitchener-Waterloo dwindled, the initiative was taken on by the local Public Interest Research Group (PIRG), a social justice agency. This resulted in increased membership and trading volume; though, for better or for worse, the LETS is now associated with the other activities of the PIRG.

In the Netherlands, Strohalm, a social justice agency which advocates for ecotaxes and other environmental issues, serves as the central advisory body for all the LETS in the country. Strohalm has put considerable effort in setting up the Noppes system and, although Noppes have their own administration with full time staff, continues to assist with both the conceptual and practical aspects of system development. The association of Noppes with Strohalm, which is seen as a radical supporter of social change, may at least partially account for the decision to rename the currency for use in a business-friendly barter circle.

In Peterborough, the Community Opportunity and Innovation Network (COIN), a non-profit CED (Community Economic Development) group, was involved from the outset to help garner government and local business support for their system. It is widely accepted that Peterborough LETS has been the most successful LETS in North America of recent years at involving business.

After the preliminary groundwork is laid, it is important that the leadership circle be broadened to include as large a cross-section of the chosen community as possible. This involves the creation of an administrative committee.

4.1.2 Administration

A process for the selection of the administrative committee to replace the original champion (though it may include the champion) should be agreed upon by the general membership. Typically, such committees involve at least three members, and selection decisions are made by consensus at general meetings. It is at these meetings that the goals of the system should be clearly established and a means by which they can be achieved outlined. Some of the questions which should be addressed include:

Is the primary goal of the system to develop social networks, strengthen the local economy, reduce unemployment or educate community members?
Who should be involved?
Are we creating a parallel, complementary economy (LETS) or are efforts intended to create an alternative to the existing system (INWO, Talents)?

The importance of effective and transparent system administration should not be underestimated. To summarise its administrative goals, Toronto LETS came up with the acronym S.T.A.N.D. - Service, Timeliness, Accounting, Notices (Ads), and Delivery. According to Chris Hohner, "... when it (administrative tasks) worked like clockwork, it did more than any rhetoric to establish credibility of the system." It goes without saying that the opposite is also true.

Beyond these basic requirements, Bill Hulet of Guelph LETS stressed the importance of the administrators' role in facilitating trade - having an eye to bringing offers and requests together. In the case of business participation, we have seen to what lengths administrators have gone to ensure active participation.

 4.1.3 General Participants

The make-up of the administrative committee and the goals it establishes for the system will be reflected in the general membership. Community currency systems established in both Europe and North America have taken root in predominantly 'affinity-based' communities - that is, communities which share a common value system or ideology, either in addition to, or in spite of, geographical proximity. For example, the Maritime HOURS system in Halifax, Nova Scotia, was started by a group of Buddhists.

This additional bond should presumably make it easier to mobilise volunteer support - a key factor frequently mentioned by those interviewed. A further possible, though perhaps neglected, corollary of this kinship is the increased social pressure to trade fairly. It is possible that in a more diverse membership, it would be both more difficult to draw on volunteer effort and more likely that individuals would try to cheat the larger community (by leaving with a negative account balance, for example). However, the 'social capital' derived from a shared ideology could just as easily be generated from strong social roots which may traverse both political and economic boundaries.

The need for education activities is paramount for the general membership. Participants who are better informed about the working requirements of a system will be both more active traders and more willing volunteers. New or prospective members may "hold a suspicion that there is a catch." An effective response to such reactions is to provide concrete success stories which use clear and relevant language. Bombarding community members with complex philosophical repudiations of the current monetary system will have a predictable outcome. Two former community currency systems administrators indicated that, if they were to start a new system, they would spend as little energy as possible on academic modes of educating and focus, instead, on 'learning by doing' - learning through trade.

As with any human endeavour, it is critical not to underestimate the potential for conflict. Within those systems contacted there were numerous reports of competing personalities and widely differing agendas. Just as systems have been affected by the external perceptions of a champion or key member, so too have several systems been nearly torn apart by internal disputes. Suffice to say that those involved in establishing a community currency system should put in place, as soon as possible, dispute resolution mechanisms. This might include, for example, the appointment of an ombudsperson, the delineation of administrative roles and responsibilities, and the scheduling of regular meetings where a voting procedure is established.

 

4.2 The Community

In those places where community currency systems successfully take root, there is usually a match between the characteristics of the general membership and those of the host community in which it operates. In both Toronto and Vancouver, the membership is made up of individuals who could be best described as 'social progressives'. Not surprisingly, therefore, trading levels are highest in those areas of the city which are seen as socially progressive - Bloor West Village and Kensington Market in Toronto; Kitsilano and Commercial Drive in Vancouver. Outside of these areas, the systems are either unknown or disregarded. Whether or not these attitudes represent an obstacle to organisers depends on their objectives. What they clearly illustrate is that, if one of the system goals is to include a broad cross-section of the community, then representatives of various sub-groups must be involved at all stages and levels of decision-making.

There seems to be no clear indication as to the ideal physical attributes of a host community. This fact lends credence to community currency systems proponents' arguments that the concept can be adapted to a multitude of environments. Practitioners in larger cities observed a tendency for trading to cluster around smaller communities within the larger whole. In fact, in Manchester, a small cluster of LETS members have gone so far as to convert to the gift economy - they trade with each other as required and do not account for transactions. Maritime HOURS administrators found that the physical size of the city of Halifax (nearly 50 km from one end to the other) was prohibitive for many traders, particularly those without vehicles. While large geographic size and population may be problematic, it does not appear that there is such a thing as too small a host community. The citizens of Mount Pelier, Vermont, operate an HOURS network in a little town of approximately 4,000 people.

This raises what is, perhaps, a more important factor in determining success - resource availability and diversity. What are the possibilities for self-employment within a given community? What proportion of the required inputs could be sourced locally? The answers to these questions differ for every community and, furthermore, are dependent on the ambitions of the system participants. In Drumchapel LETS, in Glasgow, Scotland, participants were undeterred by crime levels which required volunteers to contact the police before going to visit low-income housing estates - less than ideal conditions to nurture the entrepreneurial spirit. In Peterborough, critical mass, the point at which the diversity of goods and services available for trade is able to attract members without requiring further promotional efforts, was reached "at about 300 to 400 members."

Political realities are a key factor in the community currency system equation. Organisers should know how much support to expect from local government. Experiences in North America and Europe have ranged from Hattersley LETS in Greater Manchester, which encountered opposition from the Department of Social Services (DSS) to Calderdale LETS, where local government has offered funding support in recognition of the role to be played by community currency systems in providing social services. The great majority of host governments are indifferent to system development. The political dimension will, undoubtedly, play an increasingly significant role as systems venture into new territory. If this transition is managed correctly, community currency systems may come to be accepted as an economic tool worthy of government support. On the other hand, failure to appreciate the complexities of existing powerbases may mean that they are seen as a threat which should be suppressed.

 

4.3 Responding to Real Needs

Individual interest-charging creditors encourage entrepreneurs to seek out very specific and, preferably, highly profitable, target markets whose constituents may be spread thinly across a very large area. Within a single community, the number of such individuals may be small or non-existent. The entire community acting as an interest-free creditor is better served by supporting those activities which appeal to a broad cross-section of citizens. In this sense, marketing in a community currency system is the "opposite of niche marketing". Furthermore, while trade in luxury items may strengthen social networks and, indeed, improve the quality of life, it will always represent a relatively small percentage of most peoples' economic existence. For community currency systems to play a meaningful role in local economic development, they must find avenues for the inclusion of essential goods and services. This belief is unanimous amongst participants in Europe and North America.

4.3.1 Agriculture

To date, the development of community currency systems has been focused in urban centres. While restaurants and grocery stores are included in trading, farmers are often under-represented, if not altogether absent.

One of the main factors cited for the successful and relatively rapid growth of the Ithaca HOURS system was the use of the Farmers' Market as a catalyst for trading. Little Tree Orchards receives approximately 300 to 350 HOURS ($3,000 to $3,500US) per year, which it accepts for up to 50% of the sales price of its apples and pears. This amount, which represents only 3% of total revenue, is used to hire two Ithacans to do two months of pruning in the off-season. The pruners accept 100% of their wages in HOURS, equal to $10US per hour - well above the going market rate for such work. Interestingly, Little Tree Orchards believes that they could easily handle 1000 to 1500 HOURS per year, or 10 to 15% of total income. The extra HOURS could be "used for plumbing or carpentry or taken out as owner's income."

Toronto Organics, an organisation offering home delivery of organic food to urban citizens, is a member of Toronto LETS. Initially, Toronto LETS played an important role in providing Toronto Organics with a social network through which new customers could be reached. However, problems encountered in spending accumulated Green Dollars forced Toronto Organics to reduce the percentage community currency ratio from 20% to 10%. The farmers who supplied the produce were located too far away from the city to be able to use Green Dollars. The task of sorting the produce into individual orders was originally paid in Green Dollars, however, there were problems with workers who preferred to be paid in food or who displayed a poor work ethic when being paid in 'funny money'. This experience points out two things: firstly, the necessity to match community currency inputs with outputs within the same trading cycle; secondly, it highlights the need for widespread acceptability before community currency can successfully be used to pay wages.

The use of community currencies to support local agriculture is largely untapped. Potential implementations include: farmer to farmer barter; facilitating the establishment of farmer co-operatives to process, package or deliver produce; providing growers with short-term, off-season credit; helping to establish Community Supported Agriculture (CSA) programmes; and use in urban community garden initiatives.

4.3.2 Input Factors: Wages, Credit and Rent

A major criticism levelled at community currency systems is their "... inability to address inputs." As long as trading occurs predominantly at the point of output, the percentage of the final sales price which can be accepted in community currency will be severely restricted. The present situation is such that community currency income must be spent outside the trading cycle (on separate goods and services) rather than inside the cycle (on inputs to the goods and services sold). Demand for community currency would be enormously strengthened by the integration of input factors such as wages, capital and rent.

A distinction should be made between what we might call 'first' and 'second order' wages. Systems have successfully integrated the wages of the first order group - namely, individual entrepreneurs and small business owners who take out community currency as salary. Integration of the second order wages, those of employees of member organisations, is more difficult. Isolated instances of labourers accepting 100% of their wages in community currency do exist (such as the pruners mentioned above), however, in the majority of cases, community currency is used only as a supplement to regular wages. This 'split-wage rate' raises the issue of utility discrepancies between the community and the national currencies. In a tight labour market, employers could exploit those workers willing to accept a smaller proportion of their salary in national currency. Amongst the groups contacted, this has not occurred. The greater problem, for the time being, is a lack of diversity in goods and services available for trading which discourages employees from accepting wages in community currency.

Obviously, community currency systems allow for the creation of credit in local currency units. Is there a bridging role to be played by a community currency in accessing national currency credit? If there is, the link has only begun to be explored. Alternatives Credit Union, in Ithaca, allows its members to pay banking fees, interest charges and a small amount of principal (up to 2 HOURS per loan payment per month) in HOURS. The credit union is spending the HOURS on plumbing and gardening (requiring all contractors to accept a minimum five percent of payment in HOURS) as well as supplementing staff wages. In fact, they are spending the HOURS faster than they are coming in. Several other systems are actively pursuing closer links with local credit unions - a credit union in Manchester has recently opened an account with Manchester LETS. If not through such formal links with a credit union, the opportunity exists for systems to establish their own national currency savings and credit associations based on similar principles.

Few examples were encountered where rental costs can be paid in community currency. Typical of those instances where they can is Creative Living LETS, in Manchester, which rents its meeting rooms for community currency. Why have landlords proven reluctant to participate in community currency systems? Small business owners' self-interest can be served because capacity (measured in goods and services available for sale) can be increased to exploit new markets accessible through community currency. Conversely, with a strictly limited amount of land, buildings or equipment on offer, landlords must make a trade-off between income in national or community currency. Unless motivated by factors other than purely economic ones, it is unlikely that community currency will be accepted. That is, unless the real estate market or general economy is depressed - community currency or nothing! There is a further issue to be considered; is it fair or desirable to allow owners of conventional capital to use those assets to generate community currency? While some view this as a form of exploitation, others see it as preferable to allowing the profits from such activities to escape from the community.

4.3.3 Social Services

In Europe and North America, oftentimes there is less interest in integrating social services than there is concern of how to prevent community currency systems from interfering with the receipt of state supports.

Perhaps, not surprisingly, in the absence of universal health care, community members of Ithaca, New York, have been most active in incorporating health care into a broader system. The Ithaca Health Fund offers memberships for $100US per year, which can be paid in US Dollars, HOURS or home visit credits. Members receive a discount of three to ten percent at participating health care providers. The definition of 'health care provider' has been broadened to include exercise outlets, air and water quality treatments and diet centres, as well as more traditional services such as those available at the Cayuga Medical Center. As membership grows, the Fund will accept claims for an increasing variety of health care costs for up to five percent of total available funds for any single claim.

Reaction to community currency systems from government welfare departments has been mixed. In Ithaca, one HOUR is placed in every welfare envelope as recognition of the important role to be played by the systems in generating self-employment opportunities. In Canada, earnings in LETS are ignored in the calculation of unemployment benefits so long as they are not derived from an individual's principle occupation (i.e. a carpenter doing carpentry for Green Dollars). In the Netherlands, up to 3,000 Noppes per year can be earned which will not be counted as income for benefits purposes; at present trading levels, there are no participants who risk crossing this threshold.

Without an effective savings instrument it will impossible for systems to play a proactive role in welfare provision. Green Dollars earned today will be virtually worthless in twenty years time without interest accumulation. It should be noted, however, that this function could be accomplished by the TimeDollars system where community service hours can be earned and then drawn upon after retirement, during periods of unemployment or at other times of need. Unlike other community currency units which are tied to national currencies, an hour of community service today will still be an hour of community service tomorrow. A much greater experience base will be required before any definitive claims can be made about the role of TimeDollars in providing welfare. For now, communities wishing to establish a form of community welfare outside of state structures will have to rely upon a more conventional savings association model.

Educational services obtainable in a community currency system are limited to informal activities such as private tutors and day care centres. While difficult to conceive of in a minority-world setting, there may be scope for the inclusion of the wages of primary and secondary school educators in a community currency system.

4.3.4 Taxes

Perhaps the single most effective manner to create demand for a community currency would be to declare them legal tender for tax purposes. This provides an immediate incentive for all variety of local merchants to accept the currency. The use of tobacco as money survived two centuries, nearly twice as long a run as gold, because it was declared legal tender for tax purposes in colonial Virginia and Maryland.

The benefits for municipal governments are relatively straight-forward; local economic development is promoted; taxes paid in community currency can not be expropriated by higher levels of government; and, like any other community currency system member, government can obtain interest-free credit to fund local initiatives. In a proposal to the Ontario provincial government, in Canada, a closed-end concept was proposed wherein, "... towns agree to accept 5 to 10% of property taxes in Green Dollars and then spend the units employing labour in the public sector." A similar proposal is being made in Ithaca, where organisers estimate that, "over $30,000 US in extra sales tax collection is due to expanded trading HOURS has prompted." There are no communities that the authors are aware of where such proposals have been implemented.


Conclusion

After over fifteen years of development, community currency practitioners have overcome, through first hand experience, many of the obstacles which have arisen at varying stages of development. However, with few exceptions, systems are still limited to relatively small affinity-based memberships whose trading volume represents only the tiniest fraction of total community flows. In recognition of this, administrators and development groups are now actively pursuing small business, institutional and government participation. This is not to suggest that the proven role of community currency systems in developing and strengthening social networks is being neglected; only that the scope of engagement is being increased.

Reaching critical mass will require further creative initiatives designed to gain credibility and acceptance. It will be essential for new efforts to open with a wedge which is carefully tuned for local conditions and involves key individuals or organisations chosen to further the long term goals of the system. Whether or not the backing of a community currency will speed the process of acceptance remains uncertain until such time as something like the Bonus concept is attempted. The capacity for multiple community trading and the integration of lessons learned from the barter experience should help to attract the business sector.

The cumulative experience in deciding operating policies indicates that a number of different approaches may be effective. Fees should reflect a transparent 'pay-for-service' principle. Budget spending should be prudent and follow mutually decided-upon community goals; impacts on currency depreciation should be carefully monitored and steps taken immediately to counteract any adverse effects. Credit limits, while conceptually redundant, have been an effective way in practice to maintain confidence in system fairness. All the systems spoken with tie their community currency to the national currency with the intention of gradually shifting to valuations based on wage rates or independent assessment.

Both existing practitioners and those who plan to become involved in system development should be able to examine, without preconceptions, the successes and failures of the elements of various systems. This should inspire a re-examination of local conditions and goals. Administrators who are flexible in their approach, responsive to local needs and can draw upon a number of different problem-solving tools will, inevitably, be more successful than those who are intransigent and dogmatic. Limited research indicates a tendency of LETS to favour trading in social services while HOURS are more amenable to trade in goods. Hybrid systems, which combine the convenience of notes with the power of mutual credit creation, should handle both goods and services. Presumably, further hybrid experiments will continue to broaden the range of approaches available. For this reason, it is crucial that systems world-wide are able to share new ideas and experiences.

At this time, 'people' issues are holding back further development of the concept as a tool of community economic development. The role and responsibilities of the champion should be appreciated and participants made wary of the 'cult of personality'. One way to avoid this problem is to involve a respected and highly visible organisation during the pre-implementation phase. Once an administrative committee is selected, system goals must be clearly established. Efficiency and transparency should inform all the actions of administrators. This is the most effective manner to ward off potential problems before they occur; despite conceptual constructs, community currencies must operate in environments fraught with human politics and psychology. Immediately after systems begin trading it is important that dispute resolution mechanisms be put in place. These agreements should not be complex; rather they should clarify objectives, roles and responsibilities.

Some of the ground-breaking initiatives to integrate real needs into trading should be widely shared and subsequently adapted to local conditions. Much of this still relies however, on the integration of a broad cross-section of community members from the outset. Community currency systems' success will ultimately be judged by their ability to mobilise resources.


Acknowledgements

Many thanks to all who took us into their homes or offices, allowed us to criticise and pronounce judgement on their excellent efforts, and provided invaluable advice, both practical and theoretical. Please accept our apologies for any misspellings or incorrect information.

 

European Contacts

Andy Ryrie, East Kent LETS and LETS Development House Canterbury
Siobhan Harpur, Manchester LETS and Creative Living Centre LETS
Steven Knight, Manchester LETS
Fraser How, LETSgo
Jonathan Simms, Calderdale LETS and Teaching Fellow (economics) at the Manchester School of Management
Rachael Tibett, fellow community currency researcher
Raff Carmen, Professor at Manchester University
John and Mandy Winkworth, Wrekin LETS, LETSconnect and LETSolutions
Bruno Jehle, INWO Switzerland, member of WIR and Talents
Matina Haemmerli, president of INWO, member of WIR and Talents
Renato Pichler, Talents
Rob van Hilten, Noppes
Richard Douthwaite, author of "Short Circuit" (see Bibliography)
Edgar Cahn, TimeDollars
Strohalm, Utrecht
New Economics Foundation, London
Ruerd Ruben, Department of Development Economics, Wageningen

 

North American Contacts

Sat Khalsa, Toronto LETS
Bill Hulet, Guelph LETS
Suzanne Galloway, Kitchener-Waterloo LETS
Professor Michel Chossudovsky, Professor of Economics, Ottawa University
Terry Cottam, Ottawa LETS
Lee Carlos Murray, Homemaker LETS
John Hollingsworth, Ottawa LETS
Dave Steele, Kingston HOURS
Chris Hohner, Peterborough LETS
Mike Shriner, Toronto Organics
Wayne Roberts, Coalition for a Green Economic Recovery
Nancy Lee, Calmeadow Institute
Joe Wettmore, Manager of Autumn Leaves Books, Ithaca HOURS
Carol Chernikoff, Alternatives Credit Union, Ithaca
Anne Emmett and Jack Bidell, Committee on Monetary and Economic Reform
Stephen Chan, Vancouver LETS
Mark Roseland, Community Economic Development Centre, Simon Fraser University
Ernie Yacub, Landsman Community Services Ltd.
Bob Cervelli, Maritime HOURS
Susan Hamilton, Kootenay Barter
CUSO staff including Brenda Doner, Linda Snyder, Carla Harder, Barbara Johnson, Karl Flecker, Delyse Sylvester, Anne Philpot, Fathy Ibrahim, and Debby Cote

A special thanks to Stephen DeMeulenaere, Dave Patterson, Alec Bamford, and Andy Ryrie for their criticisms and suggestions.


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